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A Taste of Wittgenstein for SFBT. 2: Philosophical 
Investigations1
Nick Drury 
This second of two papers provides an overview of Wittgenstein's later work and 
life from the perspective of what is called the 'resolute' or 'elucidatory' reading, 
for Solution-Focused Brief Therapists. This perspective takes the view that Witt­
genstein's work can be seen as a form of therapy that enables us to be more at­
tuned to the world and each other. 
"Well, God has arrived. I met him on the 5.15 train." So wrote John Maynard 
Keynes in a letter to his wife in 1929, on Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge. 
A decade after his retirement from philosophy, due to thinking he had essen­
tialiy solved all the probiems of philosophy, he decided to return due to 'grave 
errors' in the Tractatus, that had contributed to the misunderstanding of it 
by the Vienna Circle (logical positivists) and others. In the Tractatus, he had 
attempted to show that logic is not rooted in any universal laws lying outside 
the universe ( or in some metaphysical space) awaiting discovery, but shows 
itself in our linguistic projections when we picture things with words. Most 
of the time (though certainly not always) we recognise straight away whether 
something someone has said is logical or not. This is because, as language 
users, we recognise through use, and not reference to a set of internalised 
rules, whether a person is playing the 'game' or not. The implication is that 
( most of the time) we can trust our good sense to tell us if this is logical or 
1. The first paper, "A taste of Wittgenstein for SFBT. 1: The Tractatus", appeared in the previous
issue of the journal.
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not ( or that these figures add up) and now focus our attention on the more 
important things in life - ethics and aesthetics. That is to say, how we get on 
with each other and our environment, and how to make life more beautiful 
[which he suggests amounts to the same thing). Unfortunately, in the Tracta­
tus he had, largely unwittingly, endorsed the idea that language pictures real­
ity and, as a result, philosophers had become pre-occupied with developing a 
purified language for science. As such, they were missing the point about the 
importance of ethics and aesthetics, and hence Wittgenstein's return to Cam­
bridge. Incidentally, the word 'sin' stems from the Greek 'harmartia' meaning 
to 'miss the mark' (as in archery). Wittgenstein was to address their sin. 
In this paper, I will outline some of Wittgenstein's later efforts to provide 
a philosophical therapy for untangling some of the knots or conceptual con­
fusions in our thinking. I will of course, be limited by my own understand­
ings of Wittgenstein's writings and recorded remarks, and I apologise for this. 
The 'resolute reading' or the 'New Wittgenstein', as well as the 'elucidatory' 
reading have been useful for me (Read & Crary, 2000; Fischer, 2011; Hutto, 
2003/2006). As we shall see, l also refer to some of the empirical implica­
tions of Wittgenstein's work that have been explored by subsequent scholars. 
As both the 'resolute' and 'elucidatory' readings share the idea that Wittgen­
stein's work is a form of therapy for the Western intellect, psychotherapists 
may find some interest in it. Especially Solution-Focused Brief Therapists, as 
"[t)he solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem" 
(1961, §6.5212). 
Context and Method in the Investigations 
Although Wittgenstein published next to nothing over the 20 years after his 
return to Cambridge, he was preparing a manuscript (Philosophical Investi­
gations - 'Pl') at the time of his death in 1951 (from prostate cancer). Sub­
sequent to his death, collections of lecture notes were compiled, his own and 
his students, and remarks in various notebooks, which now make up the 20+ 
books of the Wittgenstein corpus. ln the introduction to the Pf, he remarked 
that his "thoughts soon grew feeble" if he tried to force them along a sin­
gle track, and so the result was more like an album "criss-cross[ing] in every 
direction over a wide field of thought". Not only that, it can be useful to regard 
previous philosophical endeavours as an attempt to present a general pic­
ture of the universe, whereas Wittgenstein's method consisted of scraping 
the picture off the window so we can see the world ( or be with the world as 
participants) more clearly. Consequently, setting out Wittgenstein's work in 
2. All references to Wittgenstein will just include date, and page or aphorism number.
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the form of a narrative poses high risks, for it may enfeeble his elucidations. 
From his notebooks and comments to friends, we could say that if there 
was a narrative to his philosophy, it would be that whilst the Enlightenment 
philosophers had scraped religious dogma off the window, 'scientism' had 
replaced it. Whereas our collective attention was once captured by imaginary 
theological entities behind the scenes influencing the they had been 
replaced by imaginary mechanisms or so-called laws of nature. Our collec­
tive attention is still governed by superstition. "[T]he main source of super­
stition results from belief in·the causal nexus" (1961, §5.1361). "Man has to 
awaken to wonder ... Science is a way of sending him to sleep again" (1980a, 
p.5). Thus the goal of his therapeutic activities is to achieve total clarity ( or
presence in the world). He comments that because industrial culture seeks
progress, "... is sought only as an end, not as an end in itself. For me,
on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves" (1980a, p.7).
"For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this means that
the philosophical problems should completely disappear" (1958, §133). Thus
Wittgenstein can be regarded as a form of Zen for the west (Weinpaul, 1958).
To achieve this clarity would also entail letting go of this narrative also, oth­
erwise it too becomes another picture on the window - "The reai discovery
is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when l want
to" (1958, §133).
Deconstrm:ting the Picture Theory of Meaning 
It wasn' t until the mid 1930s, before Wittgenstein began writing what has 
become known as the first section of the PI, and it took him the rest of his life 
to near completion of it. It is noteworthy that Pl begins with a deconstruction 
of the picture theory of meaning, that had been central to the elucidations on 
logic in the Tractatus. For some time, and as expressed in the lectures notes 
now known as 'The Blue Book' (1966), he had been preoccupied with 'one 
of the greatest sources of philosophical bewilderment' (Monk, 1991, p.337); 
the tendency to think that some things that we have labelled with a noun ( a 
substantive) must correspond with some identifiable or definable entity ( a 
substance). 'Numbers', 'time', 'knowledge', 'meaning', 'thought', 'paranoia', 'the 
good', etc., are all, what we would now call socially constructed entities that 
we have conferred existence on. When we try to pin them down with a defini­
tion, they slip through our fingers like water; yet we use these words perfectly 
adequately. In this respect Wittgenstein approvingly quotes Augustine (1958, 
§89) who puzzled over this with regards to time: "What is time? If I am not
asked, I know; but if I am asked, I don' t know".
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The PI begins the deconstruction of the picture theory of meaning with 
a quote from Augustine's Confessions, which claimed that we learnt the 
meaning of words by our elders pointing to objects and telling us the name 
of the object. This is known as the ostensive definition or teaching of words, 
and most people believe that this is how the meanings of words are learnt. 
But Wittgenstein questions this. One of the examples he gives, is to ask us to 
imagine someone pointing to an object and saying "that is sepia". For this to 
make sense to us, we would already have to know that we are engaged in a 
colour naming activity here (1958, §30). He extends this argument through­
out the first eighty odd remarks in Pl to show that ostensive definition cannot 
be the foundation of language learning, we must first learn what attention 
directing activity is going on. Is the person pointing to the table and saying 
"table" naming the object, the colour, giving us an order to climb under it, fetch 
it, etc? The first time learner has to learn the attention directing activity first. 
There is now considerable research on Wittgenstein's elucidations on 
joint attention sharing and language development. In summary, mimicry is 
present at birth, and between nine and 14 months the child begins to alter­
nate between monitoring the gaze of (m)other and what other is gazing at, 
checking to verify they are continuing to look at the same thing. During this 
period vocalizations begin to become part of these games (Hobson, 2002). 
Thus language is based on the development of this joint attention sharing 
skill ('know how'), and not 'know that' (words representing things). 
"For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the 
word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language" (1958, §43). He goes on to remark that the error of the Tractatus
is that in it, all language is explained in terms of the denotative model ( osten­
sive definition), and this is misleading as it occludes the context of use by the 
speakers. We see this today where there are strenuous efforts to tie down the 
definitions of various psychiatric terms to neurological activities. Incidentally 
this neurophrenological project was delivered a severe blow recently when it 
was found that a group of people suffering from a rare disease that results in 
bilateral amygdala damage still report fear and panic (Feinstein, et al, 2013). 
The implication from Wittgenstein's elucidations here is that it will be far 
more useful, in most cases, to attune to how this particular person is using 
this word (e.g. depression, panic, etc.), rather than attempt to tie down these 
meanings as positivism would have us do. 
Language Games and Rule-Following 
Wittgenstein called the joint attention sharing activities where words get 
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their meaning 'language games'. Outside of the particular activity that is a 
language game, words have no intrinsic meaning. A language game is a 
communally shared activity as diverse as naming, commanding, speculat­
ing, courting, doing mathematics, arguing, telling jokes, and much more. He 
talks of there being a 'family resemblance' (what mathematicians today call 
a 'fuzzy set') between diverse language games, with no one feature common 
to all. "Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of 
our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (1958, §25). "Here 
the term "language-game" is-meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (1958, §23). "And 
to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (1958, §19). 
In describing the diversity of!anguage games, he is bringing into question 
the false view of the logicians and the "author of the Tractatus Logico-Phil­
osophicus" (1958, §23) that language has a single underlying logical struc­
ture. Wittgenstein's criticism here of his own earlier views have led some 
to totally reject the Tractatus, suggesting a much larger gap between 'early 
Wittgenstein' and 'later Wittgenstein' than is perhaps warranted. The view 
shared by most in the 'resolute reading' and 'elucidatory reading' camp is 
that both works had a therapeutic orientation, and the difference is largely 
limited to one about how words obtain their meaning (Read & Crary, 2000; 
Hutto, 2003/2006). ln the Tractatus, the claim was that a word is the object it 
denotes, whilst in Pl it is the use the word has in a particular language game. 
(This raises interesting philosophy of science questions, beyond the scope of 
this paper, as to whether meaning needs to be tied down to a specific deno­
tation for scientific claims. For example, are psychological 'tests' based on 
self-report valid, as people may be using the same word in different ways?) 
The important thing to recognise here is that language arises out of 'know 
how' activities, unlike the structuralism of Saussure or the mentalisrn of 
Pinker and early Chomsky, who all suggested that understanding is a result of 
a mental calculus performed on words and other sensations. We don't obtain 
our understanding by inferences and deductions (intellectual activities) but 
via learned shared semiotic (meaning-making) activities. We attune ourselves 
to each other to play the same language games; games that are mostly iearned 
in childhood. Whilst we may describe a particular language game with rules 
(say chess), the rules don't bind the game so much as reflect an expression of 
our agreement or customary way of doing this activity (1958, §199). 
There is a widespread view, shared by those who didn't appreciate the 
say-show distinction in the Tractatus, that the rules of logic, mathematics, 
grammar, and other games, are somehow independent of the game, dictating 
whether we are applying or following the rules correctly. This view would 
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have us believe that these rules function as something of a mechanical cal­
culus, and when working correctly, in the case of language, result in meaning. 
This kind of thinking leads us to think of rule-following as an inner mental 
mechanism, a causal process; and is thus likely to give rise to such therapies 
as CBT or psychoanalysis, which attempt to discover 'faults' in the imagined 
inner mental mechanism. Wittgenstein however spends a considerable pro­
portion of the PI deconstructing this notion (1958, §143-242). He shows that 
the rules aren't independent of their use, otherwise there would have to be 
rules on how to interpret rules; (which would lead to an infinite regress). Not 
only that, if rules were independent of us and open to interpretation, then all 
sorts of interpretations could be argued to be the correct one (1958, §198-
202). For example, what stops one from deciding that the point on a sign-post 
is the tail of an arrow and heads in the opposite direction to that intended by 
the sign-post maker? This example helps us see that what constitutes a rule 
is our customary, or collective use of it. "[A] person goes by a sign-post only in 
so far as there exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom" (1958, §198). "The 
application of the concept 'following a rule' presupposes a custom" (1978, 
p.322). So the rule is not a mysterious inner process but is an expression
of an agreed custom. They show themselves when the person is playing the
game in the agreed manner. "The word 'agreement' and the word 'rule' ... are
cousins" (1958, §224). "[l]t is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the lan­
guage-game" (1958, §204).
'Private Language Argument(s)' 
Another important section of PI has been called 'the private language argu­
ment' ( or sometimes 'arguments') (1958, §243-309). In this section, Witt­
genstein shows us that we cannot have a coherent private language that is 
known only to us. This is an attack on the Cartesian idea that l can only have 
certain knowledge about my own thinking and sensations, and have to make 
inferences about what others are thinking or sensing. As we shall see, this 
has ramifications on our understanding of lntersubjectivity, or the so-called 
'problem of other minds'. In brief, the idea he attacks is that if it was possible 
to talk coherently about my own inner sensations as things only l have access 
to, then I should be able to formulate a private language about these that is 
only meaningful to me. The problem with this however is that if I was to point 
to some inner sensation, presumably known only to myself, what certainty 
do I have that I am pointing to the same sensation on subsequent occasions? 
By contrast, if I was to point to a chess piece and say "that is a bishop", you 
would no doubt correct me if it was a rook However if my memory is the 
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criteria for identifying this as the same sensation, I have no way of knowing 
whether it is correct in identifying this as the same sensation I had yesterday. 
"I have no criteria of correctness" (1958, §258). The problem here is not just 
that my memory could be faulty, but unlike public events, there is no way I 
can step outside myself to confirm or verify the accuracy of my account. He 
amusingly gives us this quip on the problem of the self-referentiality of the 
puzzle: "As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning newspaper 
to assure himself that what it said was true" (1958, §265). There is no way to 
distinguish what seems corr�ct from what is correct. So we need to let go of 
any certainty here. 
Now the philosophical knot that we have gotten ourselves into here, arose 
because we began from a Cartesian assumption that T or my mind was an 
observer, separate from the sensation, and I was observing my sensations 
like objects in the world. From such a Cartesian perspective it seems that the 
thing I can know most certainly is whether I am in pain or not. But as Witt­
genstein observes we don't say we 'know' we are in pain ( except when doing 
philosophy). "It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I 
know I am in pain" (1958, §246). I simply am in pain, and express it by groan­
ing, crying etc., or just saying 'I am in pain'. Indeed, we never learnt the word 
'pain' without the aid of other people seeing these external criteria - my pain 
behaviour. That is, the language game of pain began from external criteria in a 
shared attention context. At first, we just winced, groaned, and cried, etc., but 
gradually people taught us how to express these sensations in increasingly 
sophisticated ways, which is most useful when I go to the dentist. Now these 
expressions often take the form of descriptions, but are in actuality, sophisti­
cated expressions of my sensations. 
Thus Wittgenstein's attack on the private language argument, is not so 
much to say to the Cartesian 'you're wrong', but to show them there is an 
incoherence to their argument. The Cartesian argument could be said to be 
parasitic on language games about knowledge of things in the world, where 
we have ways of verifying or justifying our knowledge claims. However when 
I am in pain, I simply am in pain, and it is not the kind of thing I can talk about 
( coherently) in terms of knowing. There is no evidence or justification I can 
appeal to. (The reader could enter 'beetle in the box' into an internet search 
engine for more on this.) 
Behaviourism and Phenomenology 
As Wittgenstein stresses the primacy of 'know how' rather than 'know that', 
many have been led into thinking Wittgenstein was some sort of a behaviour-
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ist. Hutto (1995) points out that Wittgenstein himself shows that he is not a 
behaviourist by arguing that sensations are not a nothing ( as many behav­
iourists argued) or could be ignored ( as other behaviourists argued), but they 
are not a something separate from our minds that we are reporting on either 
(1958, § 304). As we have seen from the 'private language argument', they 
find expression in our behaviour. Well socialized expressions look like objec­
tive descriptions of sensations, but the picture theory of language has misled 
us here, for it created an illusion that there was some sort of gap between the 
sensations and the behaviour• of reporting on them. Or, a gap between the 
sensations and a conscious Cartesian mind observing them. This error in tum, 
gave rise to the argument between the behaviourists who wanted to ignore 
the reality of sensations, and the phenomenologists who wanted to give sen­
sations primacy in their analyses. It is not difficult to find adherents of both 
camps quoting Wittgenstein in their support today. 
Perception 
\Vittgenstein's elucidations on the nature of perception have a strong etho­
logical and ecological appeal to them. They further develop the 'know how' 
rather than 'know that' theme, and have been empirically demonstrated by 
Gibson (1979) and Noe (2004). Since at least the time of da Vinci, the domi­
nant philosophy of visual perception claims that bundles of light frequencies 
entering my eyes are being refracted through the lens to register on my rods 
and cones; which results in an electrochemical impulse travelling along the 
optic nerve to the rear of my brain, where the data is spontaneously inter­
preted, due to inductive familiarity with previous similar bundles of data, 
resulting in me seeing the computer screen in front of me. Most proponents 
of this perception of perception claim that we don't actually see the world, 
but a 'grand illusion' of it in our brains (Noe, 2009). 
The target of Wittgenstein's criticism of this account of perception is the 
idea of interpretation. Interpretation is a conscious activity - "I see that 
cloud as a rabbit" - which is quite different to when I just say, "I see a rabbit 
over there". We experience 'seeing' passively, we just 'see' the rabbit; in con­
trast when we are interpreting we usually experience this is an activity ( a dif­
ferent language game). A problem with the traditional view is that the brain 
has been likened as the 'T' or seat of consciousness, spontaneously interpret­
ing or organising 'sense data' into recognisable patterns. This Cartesian view 
with its idea of unconscious interpretation can be further criticised by seeing 
that it is open to the possibility of there being an infinite regress of interpre­
tations of the interpretations. 
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Much of Wittgenstein's elucidations in this domain stem from discus­
sions of ambiguous figures, like the Necker cube or Jastrow's 'duck-rabbit'. 
Rather than interpreting the figure first this way and then another way, we 
actually see something different in each instance. The traditional view that 
claimed unconscious interpretation of 'sense data' accounted for seeing led 
perceptual psychology becoming focused on illusions such as the Mi.iller-Lyer 
arrows, in order to elucidate the interpretative mechanisms. Wittgenstein's 
non-interpretative view of perception has us look at what is going on when 
seeing an ambiguous figure·first as a rabbit and then as a duck. Our focus 
shifts from one end of the figure to the other as we go from rabbit to duck ( cf. 
1958, p.212e). 
This observation by Wittgenstein has led perceptual psychologists, such 
as Mack & Rock (1998) and philosophers interested in perception and cogni­
tive science, such as Alva Noe (2004) to study inattentional or change blind­
ness, rather than perceptual illusions. Many would be familiar with the exper­
iment in which a man in a gorilla suit walks through the a group of basketball 
players and is not 'seen' by observers (Simons & Chabris, 1999). Interest has 
shifted away from interpretation of sense-data to understanding the activity 
of seeing. 
This elucidation has enabled us to see that the primary function of per­
ception is not so much identifying things in the world ('know that'), but the 
development of sensorimotor skills ('know how') for the purpose of keeping 
track of our relationship with the world. Attunement! After cataract surgery 
the congenitally blind cannot see until they successfully integrate their per-
apparatus within a sensorimotor framework (Noe, 2004, p.5). Held & 
Hein (1963) showed that a newborn kitten never learned to see until it had 
developed appropriate sensorimotor skills. There are more feedback neural 
pathways to sensory systems than input (Noe, 2009, p.22), and we are con­
stantly moving our bodies and eyes to enhance visual perception. 
Noe suggests the metaphor of a blind man with his cane as a way of under­
standing enactive perception (and cognition); using his senses to probe the 
interdependent relationship he has with the world for a way forward. Gibson 
(1979) noted that perception is not a passive pastime for a Cartesian homun­
culus, so much as it is primarily part of a particular task, such as walking, 
grasping, catching prey and so on. This has obvious ecological and ethological 
appeal, as we realise the task of the senses, and for that matter the intellect 
and language, is not primarily to obtain ( or communicate) an accurate pic­
ture or map of the world, as it is to find or maintain useful ways of relating 
with it. The task for therapists is to attune to the client in his or her struggles 
to become more attuned to the world. 
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Cognition 
These elucidations on the nature of perception have had a strong influence, 
along with other aspects of Wittgenstein's later work on the development of 
what is being called 'Radical Embodied Cognition' (Gallagher, 2008; Chemero, 
2009; Shapiro, 2011; Hutto, 2012). REC would have us understand cogni­
tive processes as involving the whole body as the locus of sensing and acting, 
and the skin as no longer the boundary of mental pathways. Harre and van 
Langenhove (1999), working ,from Wittgenstein's ideas on language games 
as joint attention sharing activities, suggest that we view 'thinking' as the 
subtle positioning and re-positioning of ourselves ( and others) in the world. 
Children who gesture whilst learning arithmetic tend to do better than those 
who don't (Broaders et al., 2007). Not only do we think with our bodies as 
we position and re-position ourselves, but mental processes are also both 'in 
here and out there' rather than the Cartesian assumption of 'mind in here, 
world out there' (Noe, 2009). This is the description offered by Bateson (and 
now called 'distributed intelligence'), where the blindman, his stick, and the 
street are all involved in the circuit of activity attention flows around (Bate­
son, 1972, p.459). (Bateson's attraction to Russell and his theory of logical 
typing appears to have led him to offer the idea that it is information rather 
than attention that flows around the circuit.) Heidegger (1962) has shown 
us that most of the time we are at one with the world; that is to say, we are 
so absorbed in our activities, so attuned, that we are not aware of any gap 
between our self and the world. The hammer or the car feels like part of me 
when I am using them. As the Mahayana Buddhists say, 'samsara is nirvana' 
- our everyday mind is already at one with the world, and so-called enlight­
enment is in recognising this. (The Rinzai school of Zen also taught that any
effort to achieve this 'one-ness', including meditation, is wrong-headed, as
one would be setting out from a position of separation. Mindfulness practi­
tioners please take note.)
Developmentally, REC researchers and philosophers argue, that Piaget's 
idea that the early sensorimotor stage is overcome or abandoned in order 
for adult cognition to arise is simply wrong. Instead, sensorimotor skills are 
refined and become more flexible (Thelen et al., 2001). Whilst Piaget saw 
the first two years as a shift from attachment to separation; embodied cogni­
tion sees 'attached-individuation' occurring as we mature. Where Piagetian 
researchers attributed errors by infants who reach for objects now hidden in 
a different place to knowledge ('know that') deficits, the embodied research­
ers see this as immaturity in the grasping and pointing activity ('know how'). 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) suggest that abstract concepts are metaphorical 
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extensions of bodily activities, for "reason uses and grows out of bodily capac­
ities" (p.17). Embodied cognition finds more attraction to Vygotsky than Pia­
get, as 'intelligence' is viewed as something that 'emerges' or is 'called forth' 
by the social environment, as we 'invite' our children to 'sense out' the world 
in more refined or flexible ways (Vygotsky, 1978; Shotter, 2011; Shotter, 
2012). Vygotsky called these social situations where change occurs, Zones of 
Proximal Development (ZPDs) where we become who we will be by perform­
ing as we are not (yet). Both 'teacher' and 'student' can be seen having antic­
ipatory responses to each other' s utterances (or joint attention activities) 
that are being modified as the conversation unfolds. Like blind men with our 
canes, we are reaching out to meet the activities of those around us, and in so 
doing we are modifying the embodied structure of our being that generated 
the anticipatory responses. Similarly, psychotherapy can be viewed as a ZPD 
where both therapist and client are active participants in the co-creation of 
'realities' via a chiasmic intertwining of anticipatory responses to each other 
(Beebe & Lachmann, 2003; Holzman, 2011, Shotter, 2011). 
Intersubjectivity 
A number of Wittgensteinian psychologists have taken the discipline to task 
over the claim that social functioning is a result of a Theory of Mind (ToM) 
(Leudar & Costall, 2009). Although there are various ToM theories, they all 
suggest that someway or another we are making inferences ( either intel­
lectual or simulated ones) to understand 'other minds'. (ToM research has 
also been criticized for defining the phenomena it claims to be researching.) 
Although there is no denying that at times we do resort to inference or sim­
ulation to understand another person, we become ensnared in Cartesianism, 
if we think this is the main vehicle of intersubjectivity. Children, some learn­
ing disabled people, and even cats and dogs get on very well with people 
although lacking the capacity to make meta-representations. The only peo­
ple who need a ToM (besides far too many mental health 'experts' ) are those 
attracting a diagnosis of autism, because, as one put it, "to make up for the 
instincts I don' t have" (Williams, 2009, p.156). Wittgenstein says we would 
be "Putting the cart before the horse" if we were to think that our reactions 
to others is primarily a result of thought (1981, §541-542). In the beginning 
was the reaction (1980a, p.31 ). 
In most social situations, there is no homunculus interpreting the 'other'. 
"The idea of the ego inhabiting a body [is] to be abolished" (1993, p.225). 
Although no Cartesian observer within, there is bodily subjectivity inhabiting 
the world: "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (1958, 
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p.178e). Our performance based knowledge of people is expressed in atti­
tudes: "My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of
the opinion that he has a soul" (1958, p.178e). An attitude is an expression
of our subjectivity, and is not 'know that' knowledge about something. Now
when we interact with another: "In general I do not surmise fear in him - I
see it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something
inside from something outside: rather it is as if the human face were in a way
translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its
own" (1980c, §170). In other·words, we don't have to look inside ourselves
to recognise the anger, indifference, joy, and so on in the face of another: "it
is there as clearly as in your own breast" (1981, p.220). "My thoughts are not
hidden from the other, but are just open to him in a different way than they
are to me" (1992, pp.34-35).
Thus for Descartes, first person knowledge of psychological states is 
unproblematic, but third person is ('the problem of other minds'); whereas 
for Wittgenstein, this is reversed. As we have seen from the private language 
argument, we learnt the use of psychological words from public criteria of 
their expression. We see these outer criteria. " 'We see emotion' - as opposed 
to what? - we do not see facial contortions and make the inference that he is 
feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe the face immediately as sad, radiant, 
bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. ' 
Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This is essential to what 
we call 'emotion
"' (1980c, §570). As you may recall from earlier, it doesn't 
make sense to say I know l am in pain, I just say l am in pain; l don't take the 
position of an observer to my own body. Understanding this helps us see that 
not only ToM, but a great deal of modern psychology is built on a conceptual 
or philosophical confusion. "[l]t is correct to say 'I know what you are think­
ing', and wrong to say 'I know what I am thinking'. (A whole cloud of philoso­
phy condensed into a drop of grammar)" (1958, p.222e). (Wittgenstein ends 
the PI by noting that psychology is barren as a science because although it has 
experimental methods, it has conceptual confusion (1958, p212e ).) 
But the ToM proponent may argue that there are aspects of 'other' that 
escape my detection, that transcend my observation. Wittgenstein has an 
exchange with an imaginary interlocutor: " 'But you can't recognise pain with 
certainty just from externals.' The only way of recognizing it is by externals, 
and the uncertainty is constitutional. It is not a shortcoming" (1980c, §657). 
The "externals" trigger my concern, which as Vygotsky (1978) puts it, is com­
pleted in my spoken utterance or gesture. Of course, my client is not inter­
ested in my 'body language' per se, but whether my expressions of concern 
are genuine or feigned. Although there may be aspects of other that transcend 
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my observation (I can see that you are upset, but may not know why yet), it 
is the immediacy of the expression that moves me to conversation of concern. 
As we know, in SFBT, I may not need to know (intellectually) what is upsetting 
you to help you, my expression of care may be sufficient on its own. Shatter 
(2011, 2012) argues that there is a relatively unexplored realm in psychology 
which he calls 'knowledge of the third kind' or 'know from' ( as distinct from 
'know how' and 'know that'). It is from within the dialogue triggered by these 
'primitive' reactions we are having with each other that new language games 
( or ways of life) emerge as we co-ordinate our perceptual and speech sensori­
motor activities. Daniel Stern (1995) appears to be describing the same thing 
when he talks of 'affect attunement'. As we become entwined or relationally 
responsive to each other, the conversation becomes increasingly spontane­
ously, or takes on a life of its own, and then, ideas novel to either or both of us 
(knowledge of the third kind) might start emerging. Sensorimotor therapist 
Pat Ogden calls this 'relational mindfulness' (2013). 
Wittgenstein & Freud 
After Wittgenstein's eldest sister Gretl, the intellectual in the family, was psy­
choanalysed by Freud (and later helped Freud escape the Nazis), Wittgen­
stein took an interest in Freud. He thought they were both dealing with ori­
entation problems or people "not knowing our way about" (1958, §123). As 
we have been seeing, these are not intellectual problems requiring an answer 
('know that'), but relational in that they require us to relate to certain aspects 
of our environment differently ('know how') (Shatter, 2011). Wittgenstein 
even called himself 'a disciple of Freud' for a while, although he was later to 
attribute to Breuer and not Freud the 'extraordinary scientific achievement' 
(1980a, p.36). This is the idea that problems might reflect processes a person 
is unconscious of, but can disappear when attention is redirected through 
talk But he was also highly critical, calling psychoanalysis "a dangerous and 
foul practice" that's "done no end of harm" (Bouveresse, 1995, p.xix). He 
thought Freud's substantivisation (turning an adjective into a noun) of the 
word 'unconscious', was seductive nonsense: "New regions of the soul have 
not been discovered" (1979, p. 40). Wittgenstein's interest here was strong 
enough that in the late 1930s he seriously considered training as a doctor 
and then psychiatrist in Dublin. However, these plans were put on hold by the 
looming war. 
In lectures describing the "abominable mess" (1993, p.107) of Freudian 
thinking, (which is now pervasive throughout psychology, psychiatry, and the 
social sciences}, Wittgenstein pointed to the confusion of 'cause' and 'reason' 
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(Winch, 1958/1990; Heaton, 2010). Freud's 'scientism' led him to claim that 
he had discovered unconscious reasons as the causes of psychological prob­
lems. Wittgenstein pointed out that in general, a 'reason' is usually known, I 
can usually give a reason why l did something; however a cause is a conjec-­
ture (and usually unconscious) (1966, p.15). He gives the example of the face 
that inspires fear or delight; the face is not the cause but the reason I was 
delighted or frightened. (It is helpful to think of the 'distributed mind' here.) 
The cause is a conjecture on how the association was first made (19 58, §4 7 6). 
Densensitisation to the face can occur without the cause ever being known; 
and as SFBT therapists have been noting forever, we don't need to know the 
cause. He pointed out that 'why' questions can lead us into this confusion as 
they can be answered with a reason or a cause (1966, p.15). Moreover, when 
giving a reason we may be pressed as to why we did that too, and get into 
what seems like an infinite regress of reasons; but the chain ends when we 
give a causal conjecture (Cioffi, 1990). 
Confessions 
The question of whether the psychoanalyst requires personal analysis was 
addressed in an interesting manner by Wittgenstein. In the mid 1930s when 
he was reading Freud, he wrote: "The edifice of your pride has to be disman-­
tled. And that is terribly hard work" (1980a, p.26e). He went about it by writ­
ing out a list of his sins and insisted on reading them to a small circle of his 
acquaintances. He then went to homes of the children he had hit whilst teach­
ing in rural Austria a decade earlier, and asked the families to forgive him 
for what he had done. One friend he confessed to asked why he was doing 
this, "You want to be perfect?" "Of course l want to be perfect," he replied 
(Monk, 1991, p.369). As Monk explains, these confessions were not to hurt 
his pride, but to remove a barrier that stood in the way of "honest and decent 
thought". Also many of the remarks in PI can be seen to be written in the forrn 
of confessions - "I feel like saying ... ", "! want to say ... ", etc. "In confessing 
you do not explain or justify, but describe how it is with you" (Cavel!, 1969, 
p. 71). We might say that in the relational mindfulness of flowing therapeutic
conversations, this is what is occurring; and I believe that is what is meant by
Anderson and Goolishian's (1992) 'not knowing' stance.
World War n and the Last Years 
As noted previously, his plans to go to Ireland and become a psychiatrist were 
abandoned by the war. He became a British citizen, gave up his position as 
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Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge, and went to work as a dispensary por­
ter at Guys Hospital in London. He endeavoured to keep who he was from 
most, but was recognized by some and invited to dine with the doctors. His 
job was to deliver medicines from the dispensary to the wards, and according 
to some, advised patients not to take them. Before the war was finished, he 
had returned to Cambridge to begin work on completing Pl. As he was never 
completely happy with the result, this project was never finished. 
During the last couple of years he made a number of notes that have since 
been published as On Certafr1ty (1969). Whereas the Cartesians and positiv­
ists had attempted to find certainty in intellectual knowledge ('know that' ) 
by hunting for foundational axioms, that they could build knowledge systems 
(e.g. logic, mathematics, the various sciences) on; he shows that any claim 
of knowledge invites doubt. Even G.E. Moore's claim that 'I know this is my 
hand' invites the question of how he knows ( even if it seems a very reasonable 
claim). Wittgenstein argues that these sort of statements ( e.g. 'here is a hand', 
'the world has existed for more than five minutes', etc) are not empirical prop­
ositions so much as expressions of our relationship with the world and each 
other. They show the common ground we share as people, and at one stage 
refers to such statements as the riverbed that the river of language flows in. 
Our certainty lies in this common ground, in our 'know how'. Our scientific 
endeavours to find certainty in intellectual ('know that') knowledge has led 
us to be out of touch with the world. It could be said then, that this final work 
marks a return to the show-say distinction that finds expression in the Trac­
tatus. 
Conclusion 
Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929 because his earlier work had 
been built on the picture theory of meaning, and as a result most had missed 
the point of it. He spent the next 22 years deconstructing the picture theory 
by showing that language works by joint attention sharing activities he called 
language-games. Representational ideas (picture theory of meaning) can 
bewitch the intellect (1958, §109), and he developed a philosophical therapy 
to "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (1958, §309). The function of 
perception is to keep track of our relationship with the world; our certainty 
is to be found here and not in any representation of the world: a shift from 
'know that' to 'know how'. Becoming attuned to the world awakens us from 
the sleep that scientism induced (1980a, p.5). SFBT, like Wittgenstein's ther­
apy, does this by dissolving problems so that we can all say, "Now I can go on" 
(1958, §151). 
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